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ABSTRACT
We examine in this paper the problem of anonymizing the prove-
nance of collection-oriented workflows, in which the constituent
modules use and generate sets of data records. Despite their popu-
larity, this kind of workflow has been overlooked in the literature
w.r.t privacy. We, therefore, set out in this paper to examine the
following questions: How the provenance of a collection-based
module can be anonymized? Can lineage information be preserved?
Beyond a single module, how can the provenance of a whole work-
flow be anonymized? As well as addressing the above questions,
we report on evaluation exercises that assess the effectiveness
and efficiency of our solution. In particular, we tease apart the
parameters that impact the quality of the obtained anonymized
provenance information.
1 INTRODUCTION
Automated workflows have been shown to facilitate and accel-
erate scientific data exploration and analysis in many areas of
sciences [13]. Figure 1 illustrates a simple workflow that is used
to establish correlations between smoking and health conditions.
Workflow provenance information, recorded during workflow ex-
ecutions, facilitates the interpretation of the results delivered by
workflow execution. It also helps better understand result validity
and reliability. For example, workflow provenance information
can be used to identify the input data records that contributed to
the generation of a given result data record, and module invoca-
tions that took place in doing so. Beyond verification, workflow
provenance information represents a useful dataset on its own
right, that can be leveraged to answer queries that are relevant
for an experiment that is (possibly related but) different from the
original experiment, to learn new hypotheses, or to gain insight
on the characteristics and quality of the data generated by given
data modules. Collected workflow provenance information can
also be used to respond to the requirements of funding agen-
cies that are increasingly requesting the publication of the data
generated in the context of research investigations.
In fields such as biomedicine and social sciences, workflow
executions manipulate and generate sensitive information about
individuals. To promote the publication and sharing of the prove-
nance of workflow executions, we set out in this paper to examine
the problem of anonymizing workflow provenance.
1.1 Related Work
Related work has focused on the problem of securing workflow
provenance and policing their access. For example, Chebotko et
al [10] and Biton et al [7] proposed solutions that derive a partial
view on a workflow provenance by hiding the data records of
given modules Our objective is different from the above line of
© 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Published in Proceedings of the ACM
Conference, July 2017, ISBN XXX-X-XXXXX-XXX-X on OpenProceedings.org.
Distribution of this paper is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons
license CC-by-nc-nd 4.0.
Fig. 1: Example workflow.
work in that we seek to provide the user with the provenance of
all the modules of the workflow by leveraging anonymization. Gil
et al. [11, 19] and Alhaqbani et al. [3] proposed policy languages
allowing scientists to specify relationships between datasets and
the workflow modules, and the properties of datasets. However,
the policy language does not specify how the datasets are to be
anonymized, and even less, how their lineage information, i.e.,
derivation relationships between data records of different input
and/or output, is to be preserved.
Davidson et al. [14] investigated the problem of module pri-
vacy, whereby some of the parameters (attributes) characterizing
the inputs and outputs of the modules are hidden to guarantee
the privacy of modules. In our work, we seek, instead, to guar-
antee the privacy of the data records used and generated by the
modules, instead of the behavior of the module.
We have examined in a previous workshop paper, the prob-
lem of identification of the k-anonymity degree that needs to
be enforced when anonymizing the datasets used and generated
by workflows [6]. In doing, we did not examine the problem of
actually anonymizing workflow provenance. More importantly,
we assumed that the modules that compose the workflow are
1-to-1 in that they produce a single data record, given a single
data record, and we did not give much thought to the problem
of lineage preservation. In this paper, we are interested in what
we refer to as collection-based workflows [18, 20, 21, 30]. The
modules that compose such workflows can take as input a col-
lection of data records and deliver a collection of data records.
Such workflows have been advocated as a way to better meet the
needs of non-expert users to model scientific data [23], and to
structure complex relationships among related pieces of informa-
tion that are processed together by the workflow [25]. This class
of workflows has been overlooked in the literature w.r.t. privacy.
Different techniques have been proposed in the literature for
protecting the privacy of individuals, notably, k-anonymity [29]
and differential privacy [17]. In particular, differential privacy
[17] has recently gained momentum as the method of choice
in statistical databases. It involves adding random noise to the
data so that the distribution of the resulting dataset is almost
invariant to the inclusion of any data record. While powerful,
differential privacy is not suitable for our purposes. It assumes
that the user knows up-front the queries s/he wants to issue prior
to the anonymization. This is not the case in our setting, where
the scientist issues exploratory queries for understanding and
eventually interpreting the results of the workflows. Furthermore,
for it to be useful, the scientist should be able to inspect individual
data records and their relationships (lineage), both of which are
not possible using differential privacy. Indeed, differential privacy
is more suited for statistical (i.e., aggregation-based) queries.
For our work, we chose to use k-anonymity [29]. This method
is not as powerful as differential privacy when it comes to privacy
guarantees. Yet, it is better suited for our purposes since it can
be instrumented, as we will show, to allow users to query and ex-
amine individual data records and their lineage within workflow
provenance. k-anonymity is also still perceived by practitioners
as sufficient for mitigating risk while maximizing utility, and
real-world applications still utilize it for data sanitization (see
e.g., [4, 12]). It is also widely popular and is used, e.g., in the
healthcare world [1, 28], and is still recommended by data protec-
tion agencies (see e.g., [2]). This technique has been extensively
investigated in the database and data mining communities [31].
Most of the proposals have focused on anonymizing a single
relational table. In workflow provenance, however, we need to
anonymize different datasets considering and preserving lineage
relationships between them. One solution that can be used to
anonymize workflow using k-anonymity would be to create a
global relational table that is obtained by joining relations rep-
resenting the input and output data records of the modules that
compose the workflows. However, this solution suffers from the
following issues. First, information about the same individual
can be found in different records. This is because we consider
collection based modules, e.g., a patient can be associated with
multiple practitioners. Second, the same tuple in the global table
may contain information about multiple individuals, e.g., a pa-
tient, one of its practitioners, etc. Moreover, as we will see later,
different kinds of individuals may be associations with different
k-anonymity degrees. For example, the k-anonymity degree as-
sociated with patients may be higher than that associated with
practitioners. Traditional k-anonymity is not equipped to deal
with the above issues. In this respect, the proposal by Nergiz
et al. [27] is related to ours. They elaborated a technique that
anonymizes multiple relations of a given database schema. While
useful, this proposal makes a number of limiting assumptions. In
particular, they consider snowflake schemas, in which there is
a single relational table that represents individuals with the re-
maining relations containing quasi-attributes and having a single
foreign key. In our work, we drop these assumptions and show
that the anonymization of workflow provenance can be achieved
in the presence of multiple datasets representing individuals with
multiple relationships (foreign keys constraints) between them.
1.2 Contributions
Our first contribution is the formulation of the problem of k-
anonymization of the provenance of collection-based workflows.
This is, to our knowledge, the first paper that extends the notion
of k-anonymization from a single relation to the provenance
of workflows. Our second contribution is a technique for k-
anonymizing the provenance of a single module, i.e., input and
output records together with their lineage information. Indeed,
lineage information tracing the dependencies between the output
and input of a module (and more generally a workflow) is key for
third-party scientists to understand and examine the validity of
workflow results. We examine this problem for modules that use
and generate collections of data records. Our third contribution
extends the technique proposed to cater for the anonymization
of the provenance of a workflow as a whole. Central to the solu-
tion we present is the notion of k-group anonymity, which we
define based on the k-anonymity degree and the magnitude of
the smallest input (or output) set of data records used and gen-
erated by a module. This concept allows us to gracefully reason
over the different k-anonymity degrees that may be associated
with the inputs and outputs of the workflow’s modules. We also
show how the NP-hard problem of identifying the sets of data
records to be grouped together into equivalence classes that meet
k-anonymity requirements can be cast as a scheduling problem
that we solve using integer programming.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by laying the foun-
dations of our work and stating the problem in Section 2. We then
focus on the problem of anonymizing the provenance of a module
in Section 3, and the provenance workflow in Section 4. In Sec-
tion 5, we address an issue that is inherent to our anonymization
technique, namely grouping sets of data records, and cast it as a
scheduling problem. We report on evaluation exercises that we
empirically conducted to assess the effectiveness and efficiency
of our solution in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 FOUNDATIONS
We present a data model for collection-based workflows (in Sec-
tion 2.1). The data model largely captures the properties and
execution model adopted by collection-based workflow systems
in particular Taverna [34]. We go on to present the model we use
for capturing the provenance of workflow execution (in Section
2.2), and state the problem we address in this paper (in Section
2.3).
2.1 Collection-Based Module and Workflow
Definition 2.1 (module). A module m is defined by the tuple
(Im, Om, card), where Im (resp. Om) is a set of ordered input (resp.
output) ports, and card specifies the cardinality of m. A port
p = ⟨a1, . . . , an⟩ is a list of attributes, each characterized with a
basic type, e.g., String, Integer.
Assigning a data value to each attribute in a port gives rise to
a data item, and assigning a data item to each input (output) port
of a module gives rise to a data record.
card ∈ {1-to-1,1-to-n,n-to-1,n-to-n}: 1-to-1 specifies that the in-
vocation of m takes as input a single data record and produces
a single data record; n-to-1 (resp. 1-to-n) specifies that the in-
vocation of m takes as input a list (ordered set) of data records
(resp. single data record) and produces a single data record (resp.
a list of data records); n-to-n specifies that the invocation of the
module takes as input a list of data records and produces a list of
data records. We illustrate below an example of a binding that
captures the invocation of a module m that takes as input a list
composed of two data records (see the second element in the
binding tuple), each with two data records with two attribute
values each, and output one data record (the third element in the
binding tuple) with a single data item with two attribute values.
(m, [⟨⟨1, 0⟩, ⟨2, 1⟩⟩, ⟨⟨2, 10⟩, ⟨3, 1⟩⟩], ⟨⟨0, 10⟩⟩)
We use in what follows the term input of module (resp. output
of a module) to denote the input ports (resp. output ports) of a
module.
Definition 2.2 (data link). A data link dl is defined by the pair
dl = (mi : omi , mj : imj ), where mi : omi designates an output port
omi of the module mi, and mj : imj designates an input port imj
of the module mj.
Definition 2.3 (workflow). A workflow specification is defined
by a pair w = (M, E), where M is a set of modules 1 and E is a set of
data links. w has one initial module with no incoming data links,
and one final module with no outgoing data links.
We consider acyclic workflows that have a single initial mod-
ule and a single final module, and where each module in the
workflow, other than the initial module, is reachable from the
initial module. This is not a limitation. Most real scientific work-
flows have a single initial module and final module (see [5]).
Moreover, there exist solutions for converting workflows that
do not satisfy this requirement into workflows with one initial
module and final module (see e.g., [8]).
Every module in a workflow w is reachable from the workflow
initial module minit. In other words, for each module m in w that
is different from minit, there is a dataflow path connecting m1 to
m that is composed of a sequence of modules (minit, ..., m), such
that any two successive modules in the sequence (minit, ..., m)
are connected with data links.
Workflow execution follows a pure dataflow model: a module
m is invoked (is fireable) as soon as all of its input ports are
bound to data items. During the workflow execution, data items
are transferred between connected output and input ports. For
example, the following data link binding ((m1 : om1, m2 : im2 ), di)
specifies that the data item diwas transferred using the data link
connecting the output port om1 of m1 to the input port im2 of m2.
Definition 2.4 (Workflow Execution). An execution wexec of a
workflow w is triggered by feeding the initial module minit of w
using dinit, a data record or set of data records depending on
whether the initial module expects a single data record or a list
of data records. A workflow execution wexec is a set containing
all the module bindings and data link bindings that took place as
a result of invoking minit using dinit.
2.1.1 Constructing Input Data Records for Module Invocation.
In what follows, we specify how input data records for a given
module in a workflow are constructed.
Constructing input data records for the initial module. The
data records used for feeding the invocation2 of the ini-
tial module m in a workflow w are provided by the work-
flow user. Consider that m has the input ports ⟨p1, . . . , pn⟩.
If the invocation of m expects a single data record, i.e.,
m.card ∈ {1 − to − 1, 1 − to − n}, then the user provides a data
record ⟨d1, . . . , dn⟩, where dj is a data item instance of pj,
1 ≤ j ≤ n. If, on the other hand, m expects a list of data records,
i.e., m.card ∈ {n − to − 1, n − to − n}, then the user provides
a list data record of the form: [⟨d11, . . . , d1n⟩, . . . , ⟨dl1, . . . , dln⟩],
where dij is a data item instance of the port p
i
j with 1 ≤ i ≤ l
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
1A module can appear more than once in a workflow, that is M can be viewed as a
multiset. However, for exposition sake and w.l.o.g, we assume that it is a set.
2We use in what follows the terms module invocation and module binding
interchangeably.
Fig. 2: Example of a module with multiple preceding mod-
ules in a workflow.
Constructing input data records for a module with a single pre-
ceding module. Consider two modules m1 and m2 in the work-
flow w, such that the invocation of m1 has l output records
⟨pm11 , . . . , pm1l ⟩, and the invocation of m2 has n input records
⟨pm21 , . . . , pm2n ⟩, such that n ≤ l. Consider also that each output
port pm1i is connected to the input port p
m2
i , with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In
other words, m1 is the only preceding module of m2. We distin-
guish the following cases:
• The invocation of m1 produces a single data record
⟨d1, . . . , dl⟩, that is m1.card ∈ {1 − to − 1, n − to − 1}.
If m2 expects a single data record, i.e.,
m2.card ∈ {1 − to − 1, 1 − to − n}, then the data
record ⟨d1, . . . , dn⟩ is used for its invocation. If, on the
other hand, m2 expects a list of data records, then its
invocation is fed using the singleton list [⟨d1, . . . , dn⟩].
• The invocation of m1 produces a list of data
record [⟨d11, . . . , d1l⟩, . . . , ⟨dr1, . . . , drl⟩], that is
m1.card ∈ {1 − to − n, n − to − n}. If m2 expects a single
data record, i.e., m2.card ∈ {1 − to − 1, 1 − to − n},
then m2 will be invoked r times using the data records
⟨dn1, . . . , d1n⟩, . . . , ⟨dr1, . . . , drn⟩, respectively. Notice that,
in this case, that an invocation (i.e., module binding) of m1
yields multiple invocations of m2. If, on the other hand, m2
expects a list of data records, then its invocation is fed
using the list [⟨dn1, . . . , d1n⟩, . . . , ⟨dr1, . . . , drn⟩].
Constructing input data records for a module with multiple
preceding modules. Consider a module m1 with the output ports
⟨p1, p2, p3⟩, the module m2with the output ports ⟨p4, p5⟩, and the
module m3 with the input ports ⟨p6, p7, p8⟩. Consider now that
m3 has two preceding modules m1 and m2 using the following data
links: (m1 : p1, m3 : p6), (m1 : p2, m3 : p7) and (m2 : p4, m3 : p8) (see
Figure 2). We distinguish the following cases:
(1) An invocation of m1 produces the data records ⟨d1, d2, d3⟩
and an invocation of m2 produces the data records ⟨d4, d5⟩,
respectively. If m3 expects a single data record, i.e.,
m2.card ∈ {1 − to − 1, 1 − to − n}, then the data record
⟨d1, d2, d4⟩ is used for its invocation. If, on the other hand,
m3 expects a list of data records, then its invocation is fed
using the singleton list [⟨d1, d2, d4⟩].
(2) An invocation of m1 produces a list of data record
[⟨d11, d12, d13⟩, . . . , ⟨dr11 , dr12 , dr13 ⟩], and an invocation of m2
produces the list of data records [⟨d14, d15⟩, . . . , ⟨dr24 , dr25 ⟩].
The data records used to feed the invocation of m3 are
obtained by performing the cross products of the output
lists of m1 and m2, and retaining only the data values of
the ports connected to m1. This results in the following
list of data records:
[⟨d11, d12, d14⟩, . . . , ⟨d11, d12, dr24 ⟩,
. . .
⟨dr11 , dr12 , d14⟩, . . . , ⟨dr11 , dr12 , dr24 ⟩]
If m3 expects a list of data record, i.e.,
m3.card ∈ {n − to − 1, n − to − n}, then m3 will be
invoked using the above list of data records. If, on the
other hand, m3 expects a single data record, then it will be
invoked r1 · r2 times using the data records members of
the above list.
(3) An invocation of m1 produces a list of data records and an
invocation of m2 produces a single data record. We treat
this case in a similar manner to (2) by considering that m2
output a singleton list.
We considered above the case where a module is preceded
by two modules. Cases, where a module is preceded by three or
more modules, are treated similarly.
2.1.2 Implication of Cardinality Mismatch On Workflow Ex-
ecution. We have seen in the previous section that mismatch
in cardinalities between connected modules in a workflow may
yield multiple invocations of the same module that take place
within the same workflow execution. This is specifically the case
when the invocation of a module expects a single data record,
whereas its preceding module(s) produces a list of data records.
This raises the question as to how multiple invocations are han-
dled. We distingsuih two cases.
(1) We consider the case of a module m2 that is preceded by
a module m1 in the workflow w, such that m1 has been in-
voked multiple times within the same workflow execution
we. If there is no mismatch in cardinalities between the
output of m1 and the input of m2, then each invocation of
m1 gives rise to an invocation of m2. If there is a mismatch
in cardinalities between what m1 produces and what m2
expects, then each invocation of m1 may give rise to an
invocation of m2.
(2) We consider the case of a module m3 that is preceded by
the modules m1 and m2 in the workflow w, such that m1
and/or m2 has been invokedmultiple times within the same
workflow execution we. Consider, for example, that m1 has
been invoked twice giving rise to two module bindings
bindm11 and bind
m1
2 within the workflow execution we. And
consider that m2 has been invoked three times giving rise to
three module bindings bindm21 , bind
m2
2 and bind
m2
3 within
the workflow execution we. The invocations (bindings) of
m1 and m2 are paired:
(bindm11 , bindm21 )
(bindm11 , bindm22 )
(bindm11 , bindm23 )
(bindm12 , bindm21 )
(bindm12 , bindm22 )
(bindm12 , bindm23 )
The output data records of each pair (bindm1i , bindm2j ) are
used to construct input data records for the module m3 as
explained in the previous section. A pair (bindm1i , bindm2j )
yield a single or multiple invocations of m3 depending on
whether there is a mismatch in the data links connecting
m1 and m2 to m3.
Cases, where a module is preceded by more than two
modules, are handled in a similar manner.
2.2 Workflow Provenance as Relations
Definition 2.5. Given a workflow w, its provenance, denoted
by prov(w), is the collection of modules and data link bindings
that take place as a result of the executions of w.
For ease of exposition of our anonymization solution, we
encode the provenance of a module m using two relational ta-
bles denoted by prov(m, w).in and prov(m, w).out. They contain
the data records that were used and generated, respectively, by
the invocations of m within the executions of a workflow w. we
call prov(m, w).in (resp. prov(m, w).out) the input (resp. output)
provenance of m. When the referred workflow w is clear from
the context, we abuse the notation and simply use prov(m).in
and prov(m).out to refer to such relations. The schema of such
relations contains the attributes of the input ports (resp. output
ports) of m. We assume that the attribute names are unique within
the input (resp. output) ports of a module. From a provenance
point of view, we do not keep information about the order of
the data records in an input or output list, which is, therefore,
viewed as a set. This is the case, for example, in the Taverna
workflow system [33]. Because of this, we use in what follows
the terms input/output set of data records, as opposed to list
of data records. W.l.o.g, we assume that the attributes of two
succeeding modules that have the same name are connected (via
their ports) by data links. In other words, we can deduce data
link bindings from module bindings, which allows us to write:
prov(w) = ⋃
m ∈ w.M
(prov(m).in ∪ prov(m).out)
Consider a module admittedTo that given a set of patients
returns a set of hospitals that those patients were admitted to3.
Table 1 illustrates an example of two relations representing input
provenance and output provenance of the admittedTo module.
The names of identifying attributes are written in bold, and the
names of quasi-identifying attributes are underlined. Notice that
the relations contain also two additional attributes: ID and Lin.
The first is an ID that is generated internally by the workflow
systems to identify data records, and the second is used to encode
lineage information. In the case of the input provenance, Lin
specifies the data records produced by the preceding modules
in the workflow and that were used in the construction of the
data record in question. For example, the data record p1 was
constructed using two data records r1 and r2 that were produced
by some preceding modules. The Lin column is empty for the
relational table used to store the data records used as input to the
initial module in the workflow. Regarding the output provenance
of admittedTo, the Lin column identifies the data records that
were used as input to obtain the output data record in question.
For example, it specifies that h1 and h2 were generated given the
inputs p1 and p3. The lineage information we consider here is in
line with the why provenance semantics introduced by Buneman
et al. [9].
Table 1: Input and Output Provenance of admittedTo.
Input Patient DataSet Output Hospital DataSet
ID name birth lin ID hospital Lin
p1 Garnick 1990 {r1, r2 } h1 St Louis {p1, p3 }p2 Hiyoshi 1987 {r3, r4 } h2 St Anton
p3 Suessmith 1989 {r5, r6 } h3 St Anne {p2, p4 }p4 Solares 1985 {r7, r8 } h4 St August
p5 Kading 1992 {r9, r10 } h5 Holby {p5, p7 }p6 Pero 1988 {r11, r12 } h6 Larib.
p7 Pehl 1986 {r13, r14 } h7 St James {p6, p8 }p8 Barriga 1995 {r15, r16 } h8 St Mary
2.3 Problem Statement
Adversary Model. The data records used and generated by a
workflow module are characterized by three kinds of attributes:
(i) Identifying attributes allow identifying individuals, e.g., the at-
tribute name is an identifying attribute. (ii) Sensitive attributes are
3A hospital appears in the result only if it was visited by each of the patients in the
input set.
attributes that carry sensitive information, e.g., health condition.
(iii) Quasi-identifying attributes are non-identifying attributes,
but their combination can be used to identify an individual, e.g.,
address, phone number, etc. Notice that the ID attribute is not
considered as an identifying attribute because it is generated by
the workflow system and does not carry information that allows
identifying individuals such as name for example.
We assume that an adversary may know identifying and quasi-
identifying attribute values about individuals, e.g., name, address,
date of birth. However, we assume that s/he does not know sen-
sitive attribute values, e.g., health-condition, income tax.
In relational databases, a relation r is k-anonymized, where k
is an integer greater than 2, if any data record d in r is not distin-
guishable from (at least) k − 1 other records in r. This condition
is met by masking the values of identifying attributes, and gener-
alizing the values of quasi-identifying attributes (e.g., address, vis-
ited hospital, etc.). Sensitive attributes, such as health condition,
salary, are not masked: adversaries are assumed not to be knowl-
edgeable of the values of sensitive attributes. In what follows,
we use the term identifier record to refer to a data record that
has an identifying attribute value, and the term quasi-identifier
record to refer to a data record that has no identifying attribute
value but has a quasi-identifying attributes value. A module in-
put (resp. output) that is bound to identifier records following
module invocation is called identifier input (resp. output). It is
called quasi-identifier input (resp. output) if it is bound to quasi-
identifier records.
Anonymity degree of Identifier Inputs and Outputs. We assume
that every identifier input (resp. identifier output) of a module m
is associated with an anonymity degree, which we denote by kim
(resp. kom) to be enforced. Note that non-identifier module inputs
and output are not associated with an anonymity degree because
they are not bound at execution time to records that represent
individuals. We do not make the assumption that the anonymity
degrees associated with the identifier inputs and outputs of the
modules that compose the workflow are the same. This is be-
cause the modules that compose a workflow are likely to use
different underlying data sources that are supplied by different
providers who may impose different requirements when it comes
to the anonymity degree to be enforced on their data. Moreover,
the same data provider may impose different anonymity degrees
depending on the data that is retrieved from its source. For exam-
ple, an input that provides information about patients and their
health condition is likely to be associated with an anonymity
degree that is higher than an output that informs on the trips
of practitioners. In this paper, we apply k-anonymization to the
provenance prov(w) of a workflow prov(w) by creating equiv-
alence classes for the relations prov(m).in and prov(m).out for
each identifier input and output of the modules in w.M.
Definition 2.6 (Equivalence Classes). Consider the input
provenance prov(m).in of a module m. We say that the set
{E1min, . . . , E1min}, n ≥ 1, is a set of input equivalence classes
for m and write prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , E1min} iff:
1)- The set {E1min, . . . , E1min} forms a partitioning for prov(m).in.
That is prov(m).in = ∪
i∈[1,n]
Eimin, and Ei
m
in ∩ Ejmin = ∅ for
i, j ∈ [1, n] s.t. i , j.
2)- The identifying attribute values of the data records in every
equivalence class Eimin are masked, and their quasi-identifying
attribute values are generalized such that the data records in an
equivalence class Eimin are indistinguishable w.r.t. their quasi-
identifying attribute values.
A set of output equivalence classes are defined in a similar
manner: prova(m).out = {E1mout, . . . , E1mout}.
Note that the ID and Lin attribute values of the data records
are not generalized. This is because the values of the ID attribute
are generated internally by the workflow system. In other words,
they are not meaningful for human users. More importantly, they
are used within the Lin attribute to encode lineage information
that we seek to preserve.
Lineage information needs to be considered when k-
anonymizing the input provenance (resp. output provenance)
of an identifier module input (resp. output). To illustrate this,
let us consider the admittedTo module. It has an identifier in-
put and a quasi-identifier output. Consider that the anonymity
degree associated with its input is kadmittedToi = 2. Notice that
its output is not associated with an anonymity degree because
it is not an identifier output. Table 2 illustrates the input and
output provenance of admittedTo, where the input provenance
is 2-anonymized. The anonymization consisted in partitioning
the set of input data records into input equivalence classes of size
≥ 2. Notice that this anonymization operation does not guaran-
tee k-anonymization, however. To illustrate this, consider that an
adversary knows that Garnick was born in 1990 and that he vis-
ited the StLouis hospital. By examining the output data records
together with lineage information in prov(admittedTo).out (see
Table 2), an adversary will be able to infer that the data record p1
refers to Garnick. This can be more of an issue when the data
record contains sensitive information such as health condition.
Table 2: Input and Output Provenance of admittedTo
where the Input Provenance is 2-anonymized.
2-anonymized Patient DataSet Hospital DataSet
ID name birth lin ID hospital Lin
p1 ⋆ {1987,1990} {r1, r2 } h1 St Louis {p1, p3 }p2 ⋆ {1987,1990} {r3, r4 } h2 St Anton
p3 ⋆ {1985,1989} {r5, r6 } h3 St Anne {p2, p4 }p4 ⋆ {1985,1989} {r7, r8 } h4 St August
p5 ⋆ {1988,1992} {r9, r10 } h5 Holby {p5, p7 }p6 ⋆ {1988,1992} {r11, r12 } h6 Larib.
p7 ⋆ {1986,1995} {r13, r14 } h7 St James {p6, p8 }p8 ⋆ {1986,1995} {r15, r16 } h8 St Mary
Problem 1 (K-anonymization of the input and output
provenance of a module). Consider a module m with an iden-
tifier input (resp. output). k-anonymizing the input provenance
prov(m).in (resp. prov(m).out) of m using an anonymity degree kmi
(resp. kmo) gives rise to anonymized input provenance prov
a(m).in
(resp. anonymized output provenance prova(m).out) where:
1)- prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , Enmin} (resp.
prova(m).out = {E1mout, . . . , Enmout}), is a set of input (resp.
output) equivalence classes for the input (resp. output) provenance
of m, with n ≥ 1.
2)- An input equivalence class Eimin (resp. output equivalence class
Eimout) contains at least k
m
i (resp. k
m
o) data records.
3)- The data records in an input equivalence class Eimin (resp. output
equivalence class Eimout) cannot be distinguished by examining
their lineage, i.e., by examining the data records that (transitively)
contributed to the data records in Eimin (resp. Ei
m
out) or by examining
the data records that the records in Eimin (resp. Ei
m
out) contributed
to through workflow executions.
To formally define condition (3), we introduce here the no-
tions of backward- and forward-lineage of a data record. Con-
sider that a module m1 in a workflow w, and consider that the
data record dm1o is bound to the output of m1 in prov(w). We
use blin∗(wf, m, i, dm1o ) to denote the set of data records that are
bound to the input of m1 and belong to the lineage of dm1o .
Consider now another module mn in w. There exists a sequence
of modules that connects m1 to mn using data links, or vice versa.
This is because the workflow forms an acyclic connected graph.
Consider the case where m and mn is connected with the sequence
of modules (m1, . . . , mn) such that mi and mi+1 are connected with
data links for i ∈ [1, n − 1] and n >= 2.
Consider that dmn is a data record that is bound to the input
or output of mn in prov(w), we use blin∗(wf, m1, in, dmn ) (resp.
blin∗(wf, m1, out, dmn )) to denote the set of data records that
are bound to the input (resp. output) of m1 and (transitively)
belong to the lineage of dmn . We call blin∗(wf, m1, in, dmn ) (resp.
blin∗(wf, m1, out, dmn )) the backward lineage of dmn w.r.t. the
input (resp. output) of m1. Notice that we do not need to specify
that dmo was generated by the output of m’s invocation. This is
because data records are identified by unique surrogate keys that
are generated by the workflow system, which allows to pinpoint
the input or output module to which they are bound.
We define forward lineage, flin∗, as the inverse of backward
lineage. Consider that dm1i and d
mn
o are two data records bound to
the input of m1 and output of mn, respectively. We have:
dm1i ∈ blin∗(wf, m1, i, dmno ) iff dmno ∈ blin∗(wf, mn, o, dm1i )
We are now in a position to formally define condition 2 of
problem 1. Consider two data records d1 and d2 of an identifying
input or output module m of a workflow w that belong to the
same equivalence class as a result of the k-anonymization. And
consider that m′ and m′′ are modules that are respectively located
upward and downward w.r.t. m in the workflow w . Regarding
m′, the following sets blin∗(wf, m′, i, d1) and blin∗(wf, m′, i, d2)
should be generalized in order to be indistinguishable when con-
sidering the quasi-attributes of the input of m′. Similarly, the
following sets blin∗(wf, m′, o, d1) and blin∗(wf, m′, o, d2) should
be generalized in order to be indistinguishable when considering
the quasi-attributes of the output of m′. Regarding m′′, the fol-
lowing sets flin∗(wf, m′′, i, d1) and flin∗(wf, m′′, i, d2) should
be generalized in order to be indistinguishable when considering
the quasi-attributes of the input of m′′. Similarly, the following
sets flin∗(wf, m′′, o, d1) and flin∗(wf, m′′, o, d2) should be gen-
eralized in order to be indistinguishable when considering the
quasi-attributes of the output of m′′.
Problem 2 (K-anonymization of the provenance of a
workflow). The provenance of a workflow w is said to be k-
anonymized iff the input provenance of every identifier module
input and the output provenance of every identifier module output
in w.M are k-anonymized.
The above problem is NP-Hard: Meyerson and Williams [24]
demonstrated that optimal k-anonymity for a single relational
table without considering lineage is an NP-hard problem. We
present in this paper a heuristic that seeks to satisfy k-anonymity,
to reduce the generalization (information-loss) incurred as a
result, and to preserve lineage information in doing so.
3 ANONYMIZATION OF MODULE
PROVENANCE
We show, in this section, how the input provenance and output
provenance of a module are anonymized. The solution we present
is applicable to many-to-many modules but also to modules with
other cardinalities. We distinguish the case where the module
input is an identifier input and its output is a quasi-identifier
output, and the case where the module input and output are iden-
tifier input and identifier output. In the first case, the attribute
values of the output data records are treated as quasi-identifying
attribute values for their counterpart input data records. The sec-
ond case is slightly more complex in the sense that the attribute
values of the output data records are treated as quasi-identifying
attribute values for their counterpart input data records, and vice-
versa. We will not examine the case where both the module input
and output carry quasi-identifier records. Indeed, it only makes
sense to perform the anonymization when the input and/or the
output carry identifier records, and as such associated with an
anonymity degree to be enforced. That said, we will show in
Section 4 how modules that carry quasi-identifier input and out-
put records are dealt with in situations where they are used in
workflows containing other modules with identifier records.
3.1 Module with Identifier Input and
Quasi-Identifier Output
Consider the admittedTo module, presented earlier, that given
a set of individuals returns a set of hospitals that those patients
visited (see Table 1). And consider that the input dataset has been
2-anonymized as illustrated in Table 2. As discussed earlier, the
lineage associating the output dataset to the input dataset may
allow an adversary to pinpoint patients in the input dataset, even
if this is anonymized. To avoid this, the hospital dataset needs to
be anonymized in a way not to be able to distinguish between
the hospitals visited by the patients that belong to the same
equivalence class as a result of the anonymization of the patient
dataset. For example, p1 and p2 must be associated with the same
set of hospitals, and so do p3 and p4. Given lineage information,
one way to do so consists in generalizing the hospitals in a way
not to be able to distinguish between the hospitals corresponding
to {p1, p3} and those corresponding to {p2, p4}. An example
of generalization of the hospital dataset that achieves this is
illustrated in Table 3. Notice that similar generalization is applied
to the hospitals corresponding to the groups of patients {p5, p7}
and {p6, p8}.
While acceptable, there is a more effective manner in this
case to anonymize the patient and hospital datasets that yields
less generalization of the quasi-attributes, thereby reducing the
information loss incurred by the anonymization. Indeed, we can
exploit the fact that patients are grouped into input sets to guide
the anonymization process. In particular, we put sets of data
records that are used as input to a module invocation within the
same equivalence class. For example, the patients p1 and p3 are
put within the same equivalence class. Using this approach, we
obtain the 2-anonymized patient dataset illustrated in Table 4.
Notice that by doing so, we actually do not need to anonymize
the hospital dataset. Indeed, starting from the hospital dataset,
we cannot single out any patient: the same set of hospitals are
visited by 2 patients. The approach we have just described is more
effective as far as information loss is concerned. For example,
one would know that p1 and p3 visited St Louis and St Antonio.
Using the previous approach (described in Table 3), we would
infer less specific information: that p1 and p3 visited St Louis or
St Anne, and St Antonio or St Augustine.
With the above consideration in mind, we revisit the definition
of equivalence classes introduced in Section 2 by requiring equiv-
alence classes to contain sets of data records that are used as input
or generated as output of module invocations. We will also intro-
duce the notion of k − group anonymity degree, which allows us
Table 3: Input and Output Provenance of admittedTo
where the Input and Output are 2-anonymized.
2-anonymized Patient DataSet 2-anonymized Hospital DataSet
ID name birth Lin ID hospital Lin
p1 ⋆ {1987,1990} {r1, r2 } h1 {St Louis, St Anne} {p1, p3 }p2 ⋆ {1987,1990} {r3, r4 } h2 {St Anton, St August}
p3 ⋆ {1985,1989} {r5, r6 } h3 {St Louis, St Anne} {p2, p4 }p4 ⋆ {1985,1989} {r7, r8 } h4 {St Anton, St August}
p5 ⋆ {1988,1992} {r9, r10 } h5 {Holby, St James} {p5, p7 }p6 ⋆ {1988,1992} {r11, r12 } h6 {Larib., St Mary}
p7 ⋆ {1986,1995} {r13, r14 } h7 {Holby, St James} {p6, p8 }p8 ⋆ {1986,1995} {r15, r16 } h8 {Larib., St Mary}
Table 4: Input and Output Provenance of admittedTo
where the Input is 2-anonymized and the output does not
need to be.
Input Patient DataSet Output Hospital DataSet
ID name birth Lin ID hospital Lin
p1 ⋆ {1989,1990} {r1, r2 } h1 St Louis {p1, p3 }p2 ⋆ {1985,1987} {r3, r4 } h2 St Anton
p3 ⋆ {1989,1990} {r5, r6 } h3 St Anne {p2, p4 }p4 ⋆ {1985,1987} {r7, r8 } h4 St August
p5 ⋆ {1986,1992} {r9, r10 } h5 Holby {p5, p7 }p6 ⋆ {1988,1995} {r11, r12 } h6 Larib.
p7 ⋆ {1986,1992} {r13, r14 } h7 St James {p6, p8 }p8 ⋆ {1988,1995} {r15, r16 } h8 St Mary
to gracefully reason about k-anonymity for collection-oriented
modules.
Definition 3.1 (Equivalence Classes - Revisited). Given
a module m, we say that the set {E1min, . . . , Enmin} (resp{E1mout, . . . , Enmout}) is a set of input (resp. output) equivalence
classes for m, and write: prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , E1min} (resp.
prova(m).out = {E1mout, . . . , E1mout}) iff:
1)- The conditions in Definition 2.6 are satisfied.
2)- An input (resp. output) equivalence class Eimin (resp. Ei
m
out)
contains entire sets of input sets (resp. output sets) of data records.
That is, two data records that belong to the same input set (resp.
output set) that was used (resp. generated) by the invocation of
m in prov(m).in (resp. prov(m).out) cannot belong to different
input (resp. output) equivalence classes.
Definition 3.2 (k-group anonymity (kg)). We say that the input
provenance prova(m).in (resp. output provenance prova(m).out)
of a module m is k-group anonymized using the k-group
anonymity degree kgmi (resp. kg
m
o) iff each equivalence class in
prova(m).in (resp. prova(m).out) contains at least kgmi input sets
of data records (resp. kgmo output sets of data records)
Property 1. Consider a module m with an identifier input
associated with an anonymity degree kmi (resp. identifier out-
put with an anonymity degree kmo). And, let l
m
i (resp. l
m
o) be
the magnitude of the smallest input (resp. output) set of data
records in prov(m).in (resp. prov(m).out). k-group anonymyz-
ing prov(m).in (resp. prov(m).out) using the k-group anonymity
degree kgmi =
⌈
kmi
lmi
⌉
(resp. kgmo =
⌈
kmo
lmo
⌉
) yields input provenance
prova(m).in (resp. output provenance prova(m).in) that is k-
anonymized using the anonymity degree kmi (resp. k
m
o).
Proof. An input equivalence class in prova(m).in contains at
least
⌈
kmi
lmi
⌉
input sets of data records. Given that lmi is the magni-
tude of the smallest input set in prov(m).in, we conclude that an
input equivalence class in prova(m).in contains at least kgmi · lmi
data records, which is equal to or greater than kmi. In other words,
prova(m).in is k-anonymized using the k-anonymity degree of
kmi. The same reasoning can be applied to show that the output
provenance is k-anonymized using the degree of kmo. □
We are now ready to discuss the general case. To anonymize
the input provenance and output provenance of a module m
with an identifier input and quasi-identifier output, we start
by k-group anonymizing its input provenance using the k-group
anonymity degree of kgmi =
⌈
kmi
lmi
⌉
. This yields input provenance
prova(m).out that is k-anonymized using the degree of kmi (see
Property 1). Because the data records in the output provenance
act as quasi-identifying records for the data records in the input
provenance, we also need to anonymize the output provenance.
To do so, we partition prov(m).out into a set of output equiva-
lence classes prova(m).out. This is done by putting the output
sets of data records, that correspond to input sets pertaining to
the same input equivalence class in prova(m).in, within the same
output equivalence class in prova(m).out. This way, an adver-
sary cannot distinguish the data records in an input equivalence
class by examining their corresponding output data records, since
these belong to the same output equivalence class and as such
have the same quasi-identifying attribute values.
The above solution is applicable to modules with quasi-
identifier input and identifier output, by inverting the roles of the
input and output used above. Note that the lineage of the input
data records (column lin in Table ??) needs to also be considered
when performing the anonymization. We are focusing right now
on the anonymization of the input and output dataset of a single
module. We will see later in Section 4, how the anonymization is
performed when the module is within a workflow.
3.2 Modules with Identifier Input and
Identifier Output
Consider a module mwith an identifier input and an identifier out-
put. To anonymize the input provenance and output provenance
of m, we reason using the k-group anonymity degrees associated
with the input and output of m. Specifically, we distinguish the
following cases:
Case 1: kgmi ≥ kgmo. We k-group the input provenance using
the k-group degree kgmi. This yields k-anonymized input prove-
nance with an anonymity degree of kmi (according to Property
1). The output provenance is anonymized by partitioning it into
a set of output equivalence classes prova(m).out: output sets of
data records, that correspond to input sets pertaining to the same
input equivalence class in prova(m).in, are put within the same
output equivalence class in prova(m).out.
An output equivalence contains the sets of data records that
correspond to input sets of data records in the same input equiva-
lence class. Given that an input equivalence class contains at least
kgmi input sets of data records, it follows that an output equiva-
lence class in prova(m).out contains at least kgmi output sets of
data records. Given that kgmi ≥ kgmo, it follows that prova(m).out
is k-group anonymized using the k-group anonymity degree of
kgmo, which implies that prova(m).out is k-anonymized using the
anonymity degree of kmo (see Property 1). Note also that data
records in the same input (resp. output) equivalence class cannot
be distinguished by examining their corresponding output (resp.
input) data records. This is because the data records in a given
input equivalence class will have their corresponding output
data records in the same output equivalence class, and, therefore,
cannot be distinguished by examining their quasi-identifying
attribute values, and vice-versa.
As an example, consider a module, getPractitioners, that
takes a set of patients and returns the set of practitioners that
have examined those patients4. Table 5 illustrates the input
provenance and the output provenance of getPractitioners.
We omit the lineage information (Lin column) in the input
provenance because it is not useful in the example. Con-
sider that the input of getPractitioners is associated with
kgetPractitionersi = 2, and its output with k
getPractitioners
o = 2.
Given that lgetPractitionersi = 2 and l
getPractitioners
o = 3 (see
Table 5), we have kggetPractitionersi = kg
getPractitioners
o = 1.
The k-group anonymity degree for both input and output in
this case is 1. Tables 6 shows the anonymized input and output
provenance obtained using the solution we have just described.
Notice that the resulting patient dataset is 2-anonymized and
that the resulting practitioner dataset is 3-anonymized. Moreover,
we cannot distinguish between the practitioners of the patients
in the same input equivalence class, and, similarly, we cannot
distinguish between the patients of the practitioners that belong
to the same output equivalence class.
Case 2: kgmi < kg
m
o. We perform the same processing as in
(case 1) by inverting the roles of the input and output.
Table 5: Input and Output Provenance of
getPractitioners.
Input Patient DataSet Output Practitioner DataSet
ID name birth ID name birth Lin
p1 Facello 1953 pr1 Rosch 1996
{p1, p2 }p2 Simmel 1964 pr2 Bellone 1987
p3 Bamford 1959 pr3 Gargeya 1993
p4 Koblick 1954 pr4 Gubsky 1988
{p3, p4 }p5 Maliniak 1955 pr5 Heyers 1985
p6 Preusig 1953 pr6 Tokunaga 1991
p7 Zielinski 1957 pr7 Camarinopoulos 1995
{p5, p6 }p8 Kalloufi 1958 pr8 Miculan 1986
pr9 Birrer 1992
pr10 Keustermans 1999
{p7, p8 }pr11 Mancunian 2001
pr12 Bond 1982
Table 6: 2-anonymized Input and 3-anonymized Output
Provenance of getPractitioners.
Input Patient DataSet Output Practitioner DataSet
ID name birth ID name birth Lin
p1 ⋆ {53, 64} pr1 ⋆ {87, 93, 96}
{p1, p2 }p2 ⋆ {53, 64} pr2 ⋆ {87, 93, 96}
p3 ⋆ {54, 59} pr3 ⋆ {87, 93, 96}
p4 ⋆ {54, 59} pr4 ⋆ {85, 88, 91}
{p3, p4 }p5 ⋆ {53, 55} pr5 ⋆ {85, 88, 91}
p6 ⋆ {53, 55} pr6 ⋆ {85, 88, 91}
p7 ⋆ {57, 58} pr7 ⋆ {86, 92, 95}
{p5, p6 }p8 ⋆ {57, 58} pr8 ⋆ {86, 92, 95}
pr9 ⋆ {86, 92, 95}
pr10 ⋆ {82, 99, 01}
{p7, p8 }pr11 ⋆ {82, 99, 01}
pr12 ⋆ {82, 99, 01}
4 DATA PRIVACY OF WORKFLOW
PROVENANCE
Given a workflow w, we seek to anonymize its provenance
prov(w) by anonymizing the input provenance and output prove-
nance of its constituent modules. In doing so, we can use the
method presented in the previous section as is to anonymize the
data used and generated by each module, in an independent fash-
ion. Unfortunately, this solution may lead to a breach of privacy.
Indeed, equivalence classes will be formed without consideration
to lineage between data records output by given modules and
the data records used to feed the succeeding modules within the
workflow, which may lead to a privacy breach.
To illustrate this, consider a simple workflow composed of two
modules (see Figure 3). And consider that the workflow has been
executed four times. Table 7 illustrates the data records used and
4A practitioner appears in the output set only if it has examined every
patient in the input set.
Fig. 3: Simple workflow example.
generated by the first module, and Table 9 illustrates the data
records used and generated by the secondmodule in theworkflow.
Notice that the output of the first module (in Table 7) is identical
to the input of the second module (in Table 9). This is because the
data records produced by the executions of the first module are
used to feed the executions of the second. Consider that the input
and output of the first module are associated with the anonymity
degree 2, and so is the input of the second module. The output of
the second module is not associated with an anonymity degree
because it does not produce identifier records. Consider now
that the input and output data records of each module were
anonymized independently, i.e., without consideration of the
data dependency between the first and second modules. Table 8
illustrates the anonymized data records for the input and output
of the first module, whereas Table 10 illustrates the anonymized
data records for the input and output of the second module.
Notice that the data records representing the surgeons, which are
generated by the first module and used as input by the second
module, were grouped differently in Tables 8 and 10 to meet
the anonymity degree 2. In particular, the surgeon Parsons was
grouped with surgeon Fox in Table 8, and with surgeonMason in
Table 10. Suppose now that a user of the anonymized provenance
knew that Parsons was born in 1979. Because of the difference of
the grouping in Tables 8 and 10, s/he will be able to deduce that
the data record s4 refers to surgeon Parson, and that this one has
a low success rate of 30%.
Table 7: Input and output data records of Getsurдeon.
ID name YoB Lin
p1 Facello 1995 −
p2 Bond 1992 −
p3 Oliver 1982 −
p4 Habbard 1981 −
ID name YoB Lin
s1 Moore 1970 p1
s2 Manson 1972 p2
s3 Fox 1969 p3
s4 Parsons 1979 p4
Table 8: Anonymized input and output data records of
Getsurдeon.
ID name YoB Lin
p1 ⋆ {92,95} −
p2 ⋆ {92,95} −
p3 ⋆ {81,82} −
p4 ⋆ {81,82} −
ID name DoB Lin
s1 ⋆ {70,72} p1
s2 ⋆ {70,72} p2
s3 ⋆ {69,79} p3
s4 ⋆ {69,79} p4
Table 9: Input and output data records of GetSuccessRate.
ID name YoB Lin
s1 Moore 1970 p1
s2 Manson 1972 p2
s3 Fox 1969 p3
s4 Parsons 1979 p4
ID hospital rate Lin
r1 St Louis 70% s1
r2 St Antonio 75% s2
r3 St Anne 60% s3
r4 st Augustine 30% s4
Table 10: Input and output data records of GetSuccessRate.
ID name YoB Lin
s1 ⋆ {69,70} p1
s2 ⋆ {72,79} p2
s3 ⋆ {69,70} p3
s4 ⋆ {72,79} p4
ID hospital rate Lin
r1 {St Louis, 70% s1St Antonio }
r2 {St Louis, 75% s2St Antonio }
r3 {St Anne, 60% s3St Augustine}
r4 {St Anne, 30% s4St Augustine}
Table 11: Correctly anonymized output data records of
GetSuccessRate.
record_ID hospital rate Lin
r1 {St Louis, St Antonio } 70% s1
r2 {St Louis, St Antonio } 75% s1
r3 {St Anne, St Augustine} 60% s1
r4 {St Anne, St Augustine} 30% s1
We, therefore, designed an algorithm that ensures that lineage
information cannot be used by an adversary to uncover private
information about individuals. For the purpose of the anonymiza-
tion algorithm, we will be shortly presenting, we group the work-
flow modules into levels as illustrated in Figure 4. A module
belongs to level O if it does not have a previous module. A mod-
ule belongs to a level i where i > 0, if it has at least an incoming
data link connected to a module in level i − 1, and it does not
have any incoming data link connected to a module in level ≥ i.
Fig. 4: Workflow levels.
Algorithm 1 Anonymize Workflow Provenance
Input: w, the workflow specification.
Input: Modules = {L0, . . . , Lk } //workflow modules grouped into levels (breadth)
from the sink to the source.
prov(w), the provenance of the workflow w.
kg, group anonymity degree.
Output: Prova(w) // anonymized provenance
1: for Level in Modules do
2: for m in Level do
3: if (m is the initial module) then
4: prova(m).in← anonymizeInitialInput(m, prov(m).in, kg)
5: prova(m).out← anonymizeOutput(m, prov(m).out, prova(m).in)
6: else
7: prova(m).in← constructInputRecords(m, prec(m))
8: prova(m).out← anonymizeOutput(m, prov(m).out, prova(m).in)
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: prova(w) ← ⋃m∈w.M profa(m)
13: return prova(w)
To anonymize the provenance of a workflow w, Algorithm
1 takes as input the modules that compose the workflow orga-
nized into levels from the source to the sink, the provenance
of the workflow prov(w), as well as a group anonymity degree
kg to be applied to the input provenance of the initial module
of the workflow. (We will see later which k-group anonymity
degree is used.) The algorithm examines the modules by level.
For the first level composed of the initial module minit, the func-
tion anonymizeInitialinput() (line 4) anonymizes the input
data of such module using the k-group degree kg and produces
the set of equivalence classes prova(minit).in. The output data
records of the initial module are used to feed the operation
anonymizeOutput(), which produces prova(minit).out (line 5).
For a module m that belongs to a level other than the initial one,
the algorithm starts by constructing the anonymized input data
records by using the anonymized data records of the preceding
output in the previous level using the constructInputRecords()
operation (lines 7). The output data records of m are, then,
anonymized by using the same grouping applied to its inputs
to produce prova(m).out using the anonymizeOuput() operation
(line 8). The algorithm terminates when the provenance of the
module that belongs to the sink level is anonymized.
To illustrate this, consider again the simple workflow in Fig-
ure 3, and consider now that the anonymity degree associated
with the output of GetSurgeon is lower than that is required for
the input of GetSuccessRate, i.e., kGetSurgeono < kGetSuccessRatei .
Anonymizing the output data records of getSurgeon using
the degree kgetSurgeono will breach the anonymity degree
kGetSuccessRatei imposed on the input of GetSuccessRate. On
the other hand, if we chose kGetSuccessRatei when anonymizing
the input data records of getSurgeon (and hence the input data
records of getSurgeon), then the anonymity degrees of the two
will be respected in the obtained anonymized provenance). The
modules in the above example are 1-to-1. In the general case
where the workflow contains modules with other cardinalities,
we reason in terms of k-group anonymity. Specifically, the theo-
rem that follows specifies the k-group anonymity degree to be
used for any workflow.
Having described how Algorithm 1 operates, we will describe
in detail the operations used in the algorithm. We will also list
the guarantees respected by each operation. Before proceeding to
the presentation of the operations used in our algorithm, we start
by defining the notion of lineage-related equivalence classes.
Definition 4.1 (Lineage-Related Equivalence Classes). Let E1 and
E2 be two different equivalence classes. We say that E1 and E2 are
lineage-related iff there are data records in E1 that (transitively)
contributed through workflow executions to data records in E2,
or vice-versa.
anonymizeInitialInput(m, prov(m).in, kg). This operation
generates input equivalence classes for the initial module m:
prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , Enmin}, n ≥ 1. Such equivalences
classes are obtained by partitioning the input sets of data records
in prov(m).in into groups, each containing at least kg input sets.
Each group gives rise to an equivalence class by masking the
identifying attribute values of its data records and generalizing
their quasi-identifying attribute values such that the data records
in the group are indistinguishable w.r.t. their quasi-identifying
attribute values. Details about the partitioning operation are
presented later in Section 5.
Guarantees:
• G1: prov(minit)a.in is kg group anonymized.
Indeed, every equivalence class in prov(minit)a.in is guar-
anteed to have at least kg input sets.
anonymizeOutput(m, prov(m).out, prova(m).in). Given
anonymized input provenance prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , Enmin}
of a module m, this operation generates anonymized output
provenance of that module: prova(m).out = {E1mout, . . . , Enmout}.
To do so, for every input equivalence class Eimin, a group Gi
m
out
containing the output sets of data records in prov(m).out
that are lineage dependent on input sets of data records in
Eimin, is constructed. Each group Gi
m
out gives rise to an output
equivalence class Eimout by masking the identifying attribute
values of the data records in Gimout and by generalizing their
quasi-identifying attribute values such that the data records in
the group are indistinguishable w.r.t. their quasi-identifying
attribute values.
Guarantees:
• G2: for every equivalence class Emin in prova(m).in,
anonymizeOutput() generates one lineage-related equiv-
alence Emout in prov
a(m).out.
Indeed, for every equivalence class Emin in prov
a(m).in,
anonymizeOutput() generates one equivalence class in
Emout in prov
a(m).out. Emin and Emout are lineage-related.
This follows from the fact that the sets of data records
in Emout represent output sets of data records that are ob-
tained as a result of the invocation of the module m using
the input sets of data records in Emin.• G3: anonymizeOutput() preserves k-group anonymity
degree. That is, the number of output sets of data
records in an output equivalence class Emout, generated
by anonymizeOutput(), is equal to the number of input
sets of data records in the input equivalence class Emin that
is used as input to that operation.
This follows from the fact that the number of output sets
of data records in the equivalence class Emout, that is gener-
ated using anonymizeOutput(), is equal to the number of
invocations of the module m, which is equal to the number
of input sets of data records in the input equivalence class
Emin.
ConstructInputRecords(m, prec(m)). construct input equiv-
alence classes for m given the output equivalence classes of its
preceding modules prec(m). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: m is preceded by one module: prec(m) = {m′}
There are data links connecting the output ports of m′
to the input ports of m. Given the anonymized output
provenance prova(m′).out = {E1m′out, . . . , Enm
′
out} of m′, this op-
eration generates the anonymized input provenance of m,
prova(m).in = {E1min, . . . , Enmin}, as follows: For every output
equivalence class Eim′out, a group Gi
m
in is constructed contain-
ing the input sets of data records in prov(m).in that are lineage
dependent on output sets of data records in Eim′out. Each data
record in Gimin has one lineage-dependent data record in Ei
m′
out
(this is an implication of the data-driven workflow execution
model). The data records in Gimin are, therefore, anonymized by
masking their identifying attribute values, and by replacing their
quasi-identifying attribute values, with the values used in their
lineage-dependent data records in Eim′out. Thereby, each group
Gimin gives rise to an input equivalence class Ei
m
in.
Case 2: m is preceded by multiple modules. Suppose that
prec(m) = {m1, m2}. Cases, where a module has more than two
preceding modules, are handled in the same manner. Given
the anonymized output provenance prova(m1).out of m1 and
the anonymized output provenance prova(m2).out of m2, the
anonymized input provenance prova(m).in of m is obtained using
the following process:
For pair (Eim1out, Ejm2out) in (prova(m1).out, prova(m1).out), if
there exists a data record d in prov(m).in that is lineage depen-
dent on a data record in Eim1out and a data record in Ej
m2
out, a
group Gijmin containing the data records in prov
a(m).in that are
lineage-dependent on data records from both equivalence classes
Eim1out and Ej
m2
out, is constructed. The data records in Gij
m
in are
anonymized, thereby giving rise to Eijmin, as follows. The identi-
fying attribute values of the data records in Gijmin are masked,
and their quasi-identifying value attributes are replaced by the
attribute values of their lineage-wise corresponding data records
in Eim1out and Ej
m2
out.
Guarantees:
• G4: Using the operation ConstructInputRecords(), an
output equivalence class of a module in prec(m) con-
tributes to one lineage-related input equivalence class of
m.
Case 1:m is preceded by onemodule: prec(m) = {m′}
Every equivalence class Em′out in prov
a(m′).out gives
rise to one equivalence class in Emin in prov
a(m).in
using the ConstructInputRecords(m, prec(m)) using
ConstructInputRecords(). The two equivalence classes
are lineage-related. This follows from the fact that
the sets of data records in Emin are constructed by
ConstructInputRecords() using the sets of data records
in Em′out.
Case 2: m is preceded by multiple modules:
prec(m) = {m1, m2}. To prove this, we start by proving
that every equivalence class of m1 (resp. m2) contributes to
at least one equivalence class of the input of m. To show
this property, we examine the different cases depending
on the cardinalities of the output of m1 and m1, and the
cardinality of the input of m.
i)- Consider the case where m1 and m2 are *-to-n mod-
ules, and m is an n-to-* module. Given that we assume
a data-driven workflow execution model, for each out-
put set s1 in an equivalence class Em1out in prov(m1)a.out,
there is an output set s2 in an equivalence class Em2out in
prov(m2)a.out such that s1 and s2 are used to create an
input set s12 that is used to feed the execution of m. This
can be proven by contradiction. Suppose, for example, that
s1 has no corresponding output set of m2, with which it
can be combined. This means that the module m2 has not
been invoked within the workflow execution that led to
the generation of s1. This is a contradiction. Indeed, given
that every module in a workflow is reachable from the
initial module, it follows that every module is invoked at
least once within a workflow execution5.
Therefore, there is an output set s2 that can be combined
with s1 to construct an input set for m. Given the descrip-
tion of the ConstructInputRecords() operation, there is
necessarily an input equivalence class Emin in prov(m)a.in
that contains at least s12.
ii)- Consider the case where m1 and m2 are *-to-1 modules,
and m is a 1-to-* module. Given the workflow execution
model, for each singleton output set s1 in an equivalence
class Em1out in prov(m1)a.out, there is a singleton output set
s2 in an equivalence class Em2out in prov(m2)a.out such that
s1 and s2 are used to create a singleton input set s12 that
is used to feed the execution of m. Given the description
of the ConstructInputRecords() operation, there is an
input equivalence class Emin in prov(m)a.in that contains
s12.
iii)- Consider the case where m1 and m2 are *-to-n mod-
ules, and m is a 1-to-* module. Given the workflow exe-
cution model, for each output set s1 in an equivalence
class Em1out in prov(m1)a.out there is an output set s2 in
an equivalence class Em2out in prov(m2)a.out such that s1
and s2 are used to create (possibly multiple) singleton sets
5Note that there is a situation in which the module m2 is not invoked as part of
the workflow execution. This is, specifically, the case when the execution of the
workflow raises an error, e.g, if the invocation of the module m2 or the invocation
of one of its (transitively) preceding modules raises an error. However, in our case,
we consider that the user wishes to publish the provenance of workflow executions
that have been terminated normally.
{s112, . . . , sn12} that are used to feed the execution of m.
Given the description of the ConstructInputRecords()
operation, there is an input equivalence class Emin in
prov(m)a.in that contains the singleton sets s112, . . . , sn12.
Given (i), (ii) and (iii), we can conclude that every output
equivalence class of a preceding module of a module m
contributes to at least one input equivalence class of the
input of m.
We will now prove that an output every equivalence class
of the preceding modules of m, e.g., m1 and m2, contributes
to at most one input equivalence class for m. This can be
proven by induction.
Base case: We start by considering the case where there
is no merge that that appears before m w.r.t. the dataflow.
That is, every path (minit, . . . , m) from the initial module
minit to m does not contain a module with multiple preced-
ing modules with the exception of m. Among the candidate
paths from minit to m, we find at least two paths: one that
goes by m1, i.e., (minit, . . . , m1, m), and another one by m2,
i.e., (minit, . . . , m2, m). This is because m has multiple pre-
ceding modules. Note that there may be more than two
paths that lead to m3, but these two are sufficient for our
proof. Consider now that an equivalence classes Em1out con-
tributes to two input equivalence classes E1min in E2
m
in of
the input of m. This means that there are two (different)
equivalence classes E1m2out and E2
m2
out that pair with E
m1
out
to yield E1min and E2
m
in respectively. The dataflow path(minit, . . . , m1) contains only modules with a single pre-
ceding module, with the exception of minit, which has no
preceding module. The same applies to the dataflow path
(minit, . . . , m2). Given that an input equivalence class of
a module with a single preceding module has one corre-
sponding output equivalence class of that module (shown
above in the case of prec(m) = {m′}) and given the guaran-
tee G2, we can conclude that the equivalence class Em1out has
(transitively) a single lineage-related input equivalence
class Eminitin of the initial module. We can also conclude
that E1m2in has (transitively) a single lineage-related input
equivalence class E1minitin of the initial module, and that
E2m2in has (transitively) a single lineage-related input equiv-
alence class E2minitin of the initial module, such that E1
minit
in
and E2minitin are different. Indeed, E1
minit
in and E2
minit
in cannot
refer to the same equivalence class otherwise by using G2
and the fact that an output equivalence class of a module
with a single succeeding module contributes to a single
input equivalence class of the succeeding module, we will
reach the conclusion that E1m2in and E2
m2
in refer to the same
equivalence class.
The above yields a contradiction according to lemma 2.
Indeed, Em1out and E1
m2
out depend on the same input of the
initial class, and so does the equivalence classes Em1out and
E2m2out, according to Lemma 2. In other words, E1
m2
out and
E2m2out originate from the same input equivalence class of
the initial module (always according to Lemma 2). Hence
the contradiction, because they should originate from dif-
ferent input equivalence classes of the initial module.
Induction hypothesis and step: Assume that there are
there are merge modules (i.e., modules with multiple pre-
ceding modules) from the dataflow path leading from the
initial module minit to m. Moreover, assumes that the out-
put equivalence classes of the modules that precede the
merge modules in the dataflow path, with the exception
of m, contributes to a single input equivalence class of the
merge module in question. We will now prove that the
output equivalence classes of the modules that precede m
contribute to a single input equivalence class of m. Given
that m is a mergemodule, then there is at least two dataflow
path one originating from the initial module and leading
to m through a module, say m1, that is (minit, . . . , m1, m),
and a second dataflow path that originate from the initial
module and leading to m through a different module, say
m2, that is (minit, . . . , m2, m). Consider now that an equiv-
alence classes Em1out contributes to two input equivalence
classes E1min in E2
m
in of the input of m. This means that there
two (different) equivalence classes E1m2out and E2
m2
out that
pair with Em1out to yield E1
m
in and E2
m
in respectively. Given
that an input equivalence class of a module with a single
preceding module has one corresponding output equiv-
alence class of that module (shown above in the case of
prec(m) = {m′}), given the guarantee G2, and given the in-
duction hypothesis, we can conclude that the equivalence
class Em1out has (transitively) a single lineage-related input
equivalence class Eminitin of the initial module, and that E1
m2
in
and E2m2in have (transitively) two different lineage-related
input equivalence class E1minitin and E2
minit
in of the initial
module. This lead to a contradiction. Indeed, according to
Lemma 2, Em1out and E1
m2
out depend on the same input of the
initial class, and so does the equivalence classes Em1out and
E2m2out, which means that E1
m2
out and E2
m2
out originate from
the same input equivalence class of the initial module.
The above analysis allows us to conclude that every out-
put equivalence class of preceding modules of m con-
tributes to one input equivalence class of m using the
constructInputRecords() operation. Moreover, the in-
put equivalence and its associated output equivalence
classes are lineage-related. This follows from the fact that
the sets of data records in an input equivalence class are
constructed by ConstructInputRecords() using the sets
of data records of its associated output equivalence classes.
• G5: The operation constructInputRecord() preserves k-
group anonymity. In other words, the number of input
sets of data records in an input equivalence class Emin is
equal to or greater than the number of output sets of data
records in the corresponding output equivalence classes
of the preceding modules.
Case 1:m is preceded by onemodule: prec(m) = {m′}
To show this, we distinguish two cases.
– An invocation of m′ yields one invocation of m. This is
the case, where m′ is *-to-1 module, or where m′ is *-to-n
module and m is an n-to-* module.6 In this case, every
output set in an equivalence class Em′out with a given
number of output sets of data records gives rise to an
equivalence class Emin with the same number of input
sets of data records.
– An invocation of m′ may yield multiple invocations of
m. This is the case, where m′ is *-to-n module and m is
a 1-to-* module (see the workflow execution model in
Section 2). In this case, the number of singleton input
6We use * to denote 1 or n.
sets of data records in Emin is greater than the number of
(not necessarily singleton) sets of output data records
in the corresponding equivalence class Emin.
Case 2: m is preceded by multiple modules:
prec(m) = {m1, m2}. To show this, we distinguish
two cases.
– An invocation of m corresponds to one invocation of m1
and one invocation of m2. This is the case, where m1 and
m2 are *-to-1 modules, or where m1 and m2 are *-to-n
modules and m is an n-to-* module. In this case, every
output set in an equivalence class Em1out (resp. E
m2
out) has
a corresponding input set in Emin. In other words, the
number of output sets in Em1out (resp. E
m2
out) is equal to the
number of input sets in Em2out. This allows us to conclude
that the k-group anonymity degree of prova(m).in is
equal to that of prova(m1).out and prova(m2).out.
– An invocation of m1 (resp. m2) may yield multiple in-
vocations of m. This is the case, where m1 and m2 are
*-to-n modules and m is an 1-to-* module. In this case,
every output set in an equivalence class Em1out (resp. E
m2
out)
may have multiple singleton input sets in Emin. In other
words, the number of output sets in Em1out (resp. E
m2
out) is
equal to or lower than the number of input sets in Em2out.
This allows us to conclude that the k-group anonymity
degree of prova(m).in is equal to or greater than that of
prova(m1).out and prova(m2).out.
4.1 Privacy Analysis
We will show, in this section, that an adversary cannot break
k-anonymized workflow provenance that is obtained using Al-
gorithm 1. In doing so, we need to show that: i)- The data
records in the anonymized input provenance prova(m).in (resp.
anonymized output provenance prova(m).out) of every identifier
input (resp. identifier output) of a module m in w, belong to equiv-
alence classes of size ≥ kmi (resp. ≥ kmo ). ii)- The data records in
an equivalence class in prova(m).in (resp. prova(m).out) cannot
be distinguished by examining their lineage (i.e., by examining
the data records they have been (transitively) generated from
or the data records that they have (transitively) contributed to
within workflow executions). To do so, we present in what fol-
lows a lemma and a theorem, each of which is accompanied by
proof.
Lemma 1. An input equivalence class (resp. output equivalence
class) of a given module:
(1) is lineage-related with at most one input equivalence class
and one output equivalence class of a different module in
the same workflow, and
(2) is lineage-related with one output equivalence class (resp.
input equivalence class) of the same module, and
(3) is not lineage-related with any input equivalence class
(resp. output equivalence class) of the same module.
Proof. We start by showing (1). Let m and m′ be two modules
in a workflow w, and let Emin and E
m
out be an input and output
equivalence classes of m. There are three possible cases:
a)- There is exist a dataflow path connecting m to m′ in w. For ease
of exposition, we denote m by m1, and m′ by mn, and, therefore,
the data flow path connecting m to m′, can be represented by
the sequence (m1, . . . , mn), with n ≥ 2. The sequence (m1, . . . , mn)
denotes a dataflow, i.e. there are data links connecting the output
ports of mi to the input ports of mi+1 for i ∈ [1, n − 1]. Given the
guarantees G2 and G4, it follows that
• Every input equivalence class in mi gives rise to
one lineage-related output equivalence class of mi for
i ∈ [1, n].
• Every output equivalence class in mi gives rise to
one lineage-related input equivalence class of mi+1 for
i ∈ [1, n − 1].
Given that we consider acyclic workflow, a module cannot
appear twice in the dataflow path (m1, . . . , mn), which allows us
to conclude that every input or output equivalence class of m1
gives rise to one lineage-related input equivalence class for mn
and one lineage-related output equivalence class for the output
of mn. Given that we use m1 to denote m1 and mn to denote m′, we
can conclude that m′ has one input equivalence class and one
output equivalence class that are lineage-related with Emin (resp.
Emout).
b)- There is exist a dataflow path connecting m′ to m in the work-
flow. The same analysis in (a) allows to conclude that m′ has one
input equivalence class and one output equivalence class that are
lineage-related with Emin (resp. E
m
out).
c)- There does not exist a data flow path connecting m to m′, or
vice-versa. Given that we consider a data-driven workflow exe-
cution module, the data records used and generated by m cannot
possibly contribute to the data records used and generated by
m′, and vice-versa. It follows from Definition 4.1 that the equiv-
alence classes associated with the input or output of m cannot
be lineage-related to the equivalence classes associated with the
input or output of m.
(a), (b) and (c) allows us to conclude (1).
We now show (2). According to G2, given a module m in a work-
flow w, the operation anonymizeOutput() generates one lineage-
related output equivalence class Emout of m, for every input equiv-
alence class Emin of m. Given that w is acyclic, it follows that E
m
in
contains all the data records bound to the input of m that con-
tributed to Emout, and the data records in E
m
in contribute to no data
records bound to the output of m, other than those in Emout. In
other words, Emout is the only output equivalence class of m that
is lineage-related with Emin, and E
m
in is the only input equivalence
class of m that is lineage-related with Emout.
We now show (3). Given that we consider acyclic workflows,
input data records (resp. output data records) of a given module
cannot possibly contribute data records bound to the same input
module (resp. module output). It follows then that an input equiv-
alence class (resp. output equivalence class) of a given module is
not lineage-related with any input equivalence class (resp. output
equivalence class) of the same module. □
Lemma 2. Consider a workflow wwith the initial module minit,
and consider that an equivalence class Eminitin of the input of minit.
The equivalence classes derived for the output of minit and the
equivalence classes derived for the input and output of the other
modules in w given the input data records in Eminitin cannot be
lineage-related to an input equivalence class of minit other than
Em
init
in .
Proof. The proof of the above lemma follows from the work-
flow execution module. The execution of a workflow w starts by
feeding its initial module minit with a set of input data records,
say sinit. The output set of data records of the initial module as
well as the input and output sets of data records that are used
and generated by other modules as a result of the workflow exe-
cution cannot possibly depend lineage-wise on an input of the
initial module, other than sinit. It follows, then, that the input
and output sets of data records that are used and generated by
the workflow execution using input sets of data records in an
input equivalence class Eminitin cannot depends lineage-wise on
sets of data records that are in an input equivalence class other
than Eminitin . Given that Algorithm 1 generates the output equiva-
lence class of the initial module in the workflow and the input
and output equivalences classes of other modules in a workflow
using data records that depend lineage-wise on a given input
equivalence class of the initial module (generated using the op-
eration anonymizeInitialInput(), see lines 3-4), it follows that
the equivalence classes generated by the algorithm depend on
one input equivalence class of the initial module. □
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). The workflow provenance gener-
ated for the provenance prov(w) of a workflow w by Algorithm 1
using as input the k-group anonymity degree:
kgmax = max(
⋃
mj∈WF.modules
{kgmji , kg
mj
o }) (1)
is k-annoymized.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we need to show: i) that every
equivalence class in prova(m).in of an identifier input of (resp.
prova(m).out of an identifier output) of every module m in the
workflow w, contains at least kmi (resp. k
m
o) data records, and ii)
that data records in an equivalence class of the input or output
of m cannot be distinguished by examining their lineage within
the executions of w (see the problem statements in Section 2).
The input equivalence classes of the initial module in the
workflow are generated using anonymizeInitialInput. Ac-
cording to G1, the input equivalence classes generated by
anonymizeInitialInput are k-grouped using the k-group
anonymity degree kgmax. Such equivalence classes give rise to
other equivalence classes by repeatedly applying the the oper-
ations anonymizeOutput() and ConstructInputRecords(). Ac-
cording to the guarantees G3 and G5 , such operations preserve
k-group anonymity. It follows, then, that every equivalence class
of an input (or output) of a module m that is generated by the algo-
rithm contains a number of input (or output) sets that is equal to
or greater than kgmax. In other words, the equivalence classes in
prova(m).in (resp. prova(m).out) contain at least kgmax · lmin data
records (resp. kgmax · lmout data records). Given that, kgmax · lmin
is equal to or greater than kgmi · lmi, which by definition is equal
to or greater than kmi. It follows that the equivalences classes in
prova(m).in contain at least kmi data records. Similarly, given that,
kgmax · lmo is equal to or greater than kgmo · lmo, which by definition
is equal to or greater than kmo. It follows that the equivalences
classes in prova(m).out contain at least kmo data records. Thereby,
we have just shown (i).
We will now show (ii). Every input equivalence class Emin in
prova(m).in is, according to lemma 1, not lineage-related to any
equivalence class of the same input, and it is lineage-related
with at most one input equivalence class Em′in of any other mod-
ule input in the workflow, and is lineage-related with at most
one output equivalence class Em′in of any module in the workflow
(including m). The data records in any lineage-related input equiv-
alence class Em′in or output equivalence class E
m′
out) do not carry
identifying attribute values and are indistinguishable w.r.t. their
quasi-identifying attribute values. Therefore, an adversary is un-
able to distinguish between the data records in Emin of an input
equivalence class of a module m by examining the data records of
its lineage-related equivalence classes. The same reasoning can
be applied to the output equivalences classes in prova(m).out.
This implies that data records in an equivalence class E cannot be
distinguished by examining the records any of its lineage-related
equivalence class E′. And, by recursion, the data records in E′
cannot be distinguished by examining the data records in the
equivalence classes that are lineage-related with E′., etc. That is,
the data records in an equivalence class cannot be distinguished
by examining their lineage, thereby showing (ii). □
5 GROUPING OF DATA RECORD SETS
Consider that the initial module of a workflow took as in-
put the following sets of records D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dn , with
l = mini∈[1· · ·n] |Di |. Consider now that the target k-group
anonymity degree is kg, i.e., the target anonymity degree
k = kg ∗ l. If k > l, i.e. kg > 1, then the method for anonymiza-
tion that we have described so far states that the inputs sets in
D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dn need to be grouped (unionied) into equivalence
sets of a magnitude at least equal to k. In doing so, the method
we presented does not specify which inputs sets in D to group
together to form equivalence classes. A naïve solution to this
problem would be to union all the datasets in D into a single
group, i.e. a single equivalence class, and anonymize the quasi-
identifying attributes of the data records accordingly. However,
the records obtained using this approach are likely to be useless
since the scientists will not be able to distinguish between any of
the data records used as input to the module in question. A more
desirable solution would, therefore, generate groups that have a
small magnitude of at least k, and yet try to keep the magnitude
of such groups as close as possible to k. We can formally define
the above problem as follows7.
Given sets of data records D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dn, and an
anonymity degree k, group the sets Di, i = 1 . . . n, into groups
G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gm, m ≤ n, such that:
(1) |Gi | ≥ k, and
(2) maxi=1...m(|Gi |) is minimal.
The above problem can be viewed as a variant of the scheduling
problem [32], in which the datasets Di represent independent
and non-preemptive jobs, and the cardinalities of such datasets
represent jobs’ lengths. There is a maximum of n machines. If
a machine is used then its load must be greater or equal to k.
The objective of such a scheduling problem is to minimize the
makespan. To our knowledge, there does not exist any variant
of the scheduling problem in the literature that meets the above
criteria.
Note to our knowledge, there does not exist any variant of the
scheduling problem in the literature that meets the above criteria.
In particular, we did not find a scheduling problem that imposes a
lower bound on the machine load, and in which certain machines
may be not used. In what follows, we prove the NP-hardness of
our problem, and show the integer program that we used for its
resolution.
Theorem 5.1. The operation of grouping the sets of input (out-
put) data records Di, i = 1 . . . n into groups G = G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gm,
m ≤ n with minimal magnitude all be it greater or equal to the
anonymity degree k is strongly NP-hard. , and therefore therefore
not even Pseudopolynomial.
7The problem statement formulated in Section 2.3 contains this condition.
Proof. We prove the strong hardness by reducing the 3-
partition problem to our problem. Given an instance L of the
3-partition problem, consisting of a positive integer B and a set
N = {1, 2, ..., n} of n = 3m elements, each having a positive in-
teger of size aj such that
∑n
j=1 aj = mb, we create an instance
J of our problem as follows. The set N = {1, 2, ..., n} represents
the set of input (or output) data records, each with a magnitude
of aj, j = 1 . . . n. Consider that the partition S= {S1, . . . , Sn} of
{a1, . . . , an} is a solution in instance L given an integer B. In
other words,
∑
aj∈Si aj = B with
B
4 < aj <
B
2 and |Si | = 3, for
i = 1 . . . n. The partition S is also a solution in the instance J,
where the elements Si ∈S represent the groups formed by union-
ing the input (or output) data records, and the integer B represents
the anonymity degree imposed as well as the magnitude of the
maximum group in S. Therefore, S is also a solution instance J .
The reduction that we have applied can clearly be carried out in
polynomial time.
Conversely, if S is a solution in the instance I then it is a
solution in the instance L. Indeed, the elements in S have a
magnitude of exactly 3 elements. This follows from the condition
B
4 < aj <
B
2 . Indeed, adding up the values of the elements of any
group with two elements of A results in an integer that is strictly
smaller than B. Similarly, adding up the values of any group with
4 or more elements in A yield an integer that is strictly greater
than B.
Therefore, if a partition S= {S1, . . . , Sn} is a solution in in-
stance L of 3-partition iff it is solution in instance J of our
problem.
□
Given that our problem is strongly NP-hard, we turn our at-
tention to approximation algorithms. In particular, we devised
the minimizeG integer problem (see below) to produce a good
quality solution. xij is an integer that can takes the value 1 if
the set Di participates in the union that forms the group Gj, and
0, otherwise (Constraint C4). yj is an integer that can takes the
value 1 if the group Gi contains at least one set in D, and 0, oth-
erwise (Constraint C5). cardi represents the cardinality of the
set Di. Constraints (C1) states that a set Di must participate in
the union of exactly one group. Constraint (C2) specifies that a
group Gj can have a cardinality of 0 (when yj equals to 0), or a
cardinality greater or equal to k (when yj equals to 1). Constraint
(C3) specifies that the cardinalities of the groups G1, . . . , Gn is
smaller than a variable Z, which represents the makespan. The
objective of the integer program is, therefore, to minimize the
value of Z. Constraints (C6) states that yj is definitely equal to 1 if
xij is equal to 1. More specifically, if the set Di has been affected
to the group Gj (i.e., xij = 1), then the group Gj contains at least
one set (i.e.yj = 1).
minimizeG Z
subject to
∑
j∈{1, ··· ,n}
xi j = 1, i = 1, ..., n (C1)∑
i∈{1, ··· ,n}
cardi · xi j ≥ k .yj , j = 1, ..., n (C2)∑
i∈{1, ··· ,n}
cardi · xi j ≤ Z , j = 1, ..., n (C3)
xi j ∈ {0, 1}, i, j = 1, ..., n (C4)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, ..., n (C5)
yj ≥ xi j , i, j = 1, ..., n (C6)
Notice that we need to invoke the minimiseG program only
once per workflow to identify the way the input sets of the
initial module are to be grouped. The output of the initial module,
as well as the input and output of the remaining modules in
the workflow, use groupings that are derived based on lineage
information (see Algorithm 1, lines 4 − 8).
6 VALIDATION
We implemented the solution that we have described in this paper
using Python 2.7. We used the COIN Branch and Cut solver (CBC)
provided by the LPModeler Pulp8 for solving the integer program
MinimizeG presented in Section 5.
Regarding quasi-identifying attribute value generalization,
we proceed as follows. Given a set of data records Gi that are
grouped together using the method presented in Section 5, we
construct for each quasi-attribute Aj a set VGiAj containing the
values that such attribute takes within the data records in Gi.
We then substitute the value of Aj in each data records in Gi
with VGiAj . This is the same method that we used in the examples
throughout this paper.
It is possible to envisage the use of more sophisticated methods
that adapt state of the art techniques, e.g., DataFly, Mondrian
and Incognito algorithms [4], for attribute value generalization
using hierarchies of attribute values (e.g., ontologies or controlled
vocabularies). This is an interesting research problem that we
leave for future work. We focus, in this paper on assessing the
quality of the grouping that we obtain for anonymization guided
by workflow lineage.
6.1 Experimental Setup
There is no existing solution that we can utilize as a base solu-
tion for comparison. Nonetheless, the approach that we have
described raises the question as to which parameters impact
the quality of the provenance anonymized using our solution.
The analysis of the k-group anonymity degree computed for a
workflow (see Equation 1), which dictates the degree of general-
ization, i.e., information loss, to be applied to the provenance of
a workflow, reveals that the quality of the provenance (level of
generalization) can be influenced by the anonymity degrees and
magnitudes of the sets of data records used and generated by the
parameters (inputs or outputs) of the workflow’s modules. Note
that on the other hand, the same equation allows us to rule out
the topology (structure) of the workflow as a possible influencing
factor. Because of this, we focus in our experiment on assessing
the impact that the difference in the anonymity degrees and the
magnitudes of the sets associated with two module parameters,
which we take w.l.o.g to be the input and output of a module, has
on the quality of anonymized provenance.
To be able to control the parameters of our experiment, we im-
plemented a python program that given lmin, l
m
out and a number of
module invocations, automatically generates module provenance.
The provenance identifies the data records that are automatically
generated by our tool. Regarding the content of data records, we
use the Adult dataset [16], a de facto benchmark for anonymiza-
tion solutions.
To assess the quality of anonymized data, we used the average
equivalence class size [22] and the discernability metric [22].
The average equivalence class measures how well equivalence
classes created by the anonymization do not exceed what is
required by the anonymization degree k. It can be defined as
follows: AEC(DS∗) = |DS||EQ(DS∗)|·k
8 https://pypi.org/project/PuLP
where EQ(DS∗) represents the set of equivalence classes created
as a result of anonymizing DS, i.e., |EQ(DS∗)| is the number of
equivalence classes created. k represents the k-anonymity degree
required. The best value of AEC is 1. It means that none of the
equivalence classes created as a result of anonymization exceeds
the required anonymity degree when performing the generaliza-
tion. We chose AEC as a measure because it is a good indicator for
the quality of the anonymized data, with respect to a minimum
requirement that is set by the anonymity degree.
As well as examining the impact of the anonymity degree and
magnitude of sets of data records on the quality of anonymized
provenance (in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4), we assess the utility
of anonymized workflow provenance by examining the degree
to which they can be used for answering workflow provenance
challenge queries using real-world workflows [26] (in Section
6.5), and assess the efficiency of our solution (in Section 6.6).
We also use the discernability metric, which penalizes each
record based on how many records it is indistinguishable from in
the anonymized dataset. The anonymization cost over a dataset
D is the sum of the anonymization cost of all records. That is:
DM(D∗) =
∑
EC∈EQ(DS∗)
|EC|2
Where D∗ denotes the dataset obtained by anonymizing the
dataset D, and EC denotes an equivalence class in D∗, that size
of which is guaranteed to be greater or equal to the anonymity
degree k .
6.2 Impact of the Disparity of kmin, k
m
out on the
Quality of Anonymization
Given the provenance of the module m, one would expect that
disparity between kmin and k
m
out, or more specifically between
the ratios kgmin and kg
m
out have an impact on the quality of the
obtained anonymized input and output datasets of m. Specifically,
if kgmout is larger than kg
m
in then the inputs records of m will be
grouped into equivalence classes that are beyond what is required
by kmin to meet k
m
output. Thereby, the average equivalence class
of the obtained anonymized input datasets is likely to suffer as
a results. On the contrary, if kgmin and kg
m
out are close then one
would expect that the average equivalence class and discernabil-
ity for both the input and output anonymized datasets to be of
good quality. To assess this intuition, we ran an experiment in
which:
1) We generated the provenance of a module m that associates
sets of input data records with sets of output data records. (Note
that we ran our experiments using different numbers of mod-
ule invocations, namely 50, 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 module
invocation. The results we obtained presented similar trends.
We, therefore, focus on reporting on the results obtained for 100
module invocations.) We set lmin and l
m
out to the same value, viz.
1. Specifically, an input (resp. output) set of data records that are
used or generated by m has a magnitude between 1 and 3 (resp.
1 and 4). (We did so to examine the interplay between kmin and
kmout. Later on, we report on an experiment that we ran to assess
the impact of the magnitudes of the sets of data records and their
variability.) 2)We then set the value of kmin to 2, and anonymized
the input and output datasets using our method by varying the
value of kmin between 2 and 20.
We ran this experiment three times. Figures 5 and 6 illustrates
the average of the AEC and discernability obtained. Notice that
the AEC of the output dataset is close (if not equal) to 1, indicating
that the quality of the anonymized dataset is optimal as far as
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bution for the magnitude of lthe constructed equivalence classes are concerned. On the other
hand, we observe that the AEC of the input dataset increases as
the disparity between kmin and k
m
out increases. This confirms our
initial observation.
The discernability analysis, on the other hand, shows that the
discernability of both the input and output increases as the kmout
increases. This can be explained by the fact that, unlike the AEC,
discernability does not factor in the anonymity degree required
by the parameter in question, and instead, focuses on the size of
the equivalence classes constructed. The larger such equivalence
classes are, the larger is the discernability. What Figure 6 shows
is that the discernability of the input and output parameters of a
module is influenced by the largest anonymity degree associated
with the module parameters (in the case of the above experiment,
it is kmout). The larger the value of such an anonymity degree, the
larger is the discernability associated with the input and output of
the module. Notice that the discernability of the output is larger
than the discernability of the input. This can be explained by the
fact that the size of the dataset representing the records fed to
the module, viz. average over the three runs is 192 data record, is
smaller compared to the size of the dataset representing the data
records output by the module, viz. average over the three runs is
238 data records.
6.3 Impact of the Disparity of kmin, l
m
in on the
Quality of Anonymization
Another aspect that can impact the quality of the anonymized
datasets is the difference between the anonymity degree and the
magnitude of the smallest input (resp. output) set of data records.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the input of a module
m. If lmin is greater than the anonymity degree k
m
in, then the mag-
nitude equivalence classes obtained as a result of anonymization
will be greater than what is required by kmin, thereby impacting
negatively the AEC. To empirically examine this aspect, we set
the anonymity degree kmin to 20. We then varied the parameter
lmin between 1 and 99, with a unit of 2, i.e., [1, 3, . . . , 97, 99]. In
particular, for a given value of lmin, the input sets generated for
a module have a magnitude between lmin and l
m
in + 3. In other
words, the input sets have a magnitude that is close to the value
of lmin. We did so to factor out the impact that the variability in
the magnitude of the input sets, which we will examine later on.
For each value of lmin, we generated the provenance for the
module m (100 module invocation) and anonymized the obtained
input dataset. We ran this experiment three times, and aver-
aged the results, which are depicted in Figure 7 for the average
equivalence class. Figure 8 illustrates the results regarding the
discernability. The chart can be partitioned into two parts. The
first part where lmin ranges from 1 to 20, and in the second part
where it ranges from 20 to 100. In the first part, we notice that the
AEC remains relatively close to 1 until it reaches the value of 15
and 17where we notice an increase of the AEC 1.5. The AEC then
decreases to values that are close to 1 for lmin values of 19 and
21. To explain this increase in the AEC, consider the case where
lmin = 15. The magnitude of the input sets ranges between 15
and 18 according to the above experiment setting. Consequently,
the magnitude of the sets obtained using the grouping ranges
between 30 and 36. Indeed, an input set on its own has a magni-
tude lower than the required anonymity degree of 20, and two
unionied input sets will definitely have a magnitude between 30
and 36, which is larger than the required anonymity degree. This
explains the fact that the AEC value is close to 1.5. In the second
phase, we observe that the value of the AEC grows linearly as the
magnitude of the smallest set grows. This can be explained by
the following. For values of lmin greater than 20, no set grouping
is actually performed: the magnitude of the input set is greater
than the required anonymity degree. The larger is the magnitude
of lmin, the larger the disparity between l
m
in and k
m
in = 20, and
subsequently, the larger is the AEC.
Regarding the discernability, we observe that the discernability
increases as the lmin does. Still, We notice that there is a slight
increase for the value of lmin = 15 and l
m
in = 17, compared with
the value of 19 and 20. This increase has the same rationale as
for the AEC, all be it less noticeable. This can be explained by the
fact that, unlike the AEC, the discernability does not consider
the closeness of the magnitude of the obtained input sets to the
required anonymity degree.
6.4 Impact of the Disparity of the Size of
Input (resp. Output) Sets
In the experiment that we ran this far, we assumed that the size of
the input (resp. output) set of data records are close to lmin (resp.
lmout). We have examined the provenance of the workflows avail-
able in ProvBench9, namely the workflow provenance collected
the workflow systems Taverna and Wings (120 workflows). For
each workflow and each of its modules, we computed lmin and
lmout. We then examined the variability of the magnitude of the
input and output sets. This analysis revealed that in the majority
of the cases the magnitude of the sets used and output by the
modules that compose the workflow follows a uniform distri-
bution. However, for an important proportion of the modules
(≈ 15%), we observed that the distribution is instead geometric
in the sense that the input (resp. output) sets have a magnitude
that is close to lmin (resp. l
m
out).
Given the above results, we decided to empirically examine the
variability of the magnitude of the parameter sets on the quality
of the anonymization considering the two distributions. For the
9https://github.com/provbench
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random uniform distribution, we used three distributions where
the maximum magnitude of a set is 20, 50 and 100, respectively.
Regarding the geometric distribution, we used three distributions
with the probabilities of 30, 50 and 80, respectively.
We then ran an experiment in which we computed the AEC
by varying the anonymity degree kin between 2 and 20. The
results of the experiment for geometric distributions are illus-
trated in Figure 9, and those obtained for uniform distribution
are illustrated in Figure 10. For geometric distribution, we ob-
serve that the higher the success probability, the better the AEC
obtained. For example, the AEC quickly converges to the value
of 1 when the success probability is equal to 0.8. On the other
hand, the AEC converge to 1 only when the anonymity degree
reaches 11 when the success probability is set to 0.3. That said,
overall, geometric distribution delivers better results compared
with uniform distribution: the AEC is much smaller. This can be
explained by the fact that the variability in the magnitudes of
the sets of data records is smaller in the case of the geometric
distribution. And, the lower the variability of the magnitude of
the data record sets, the better is the grouping of sets in the sense
that it yields groups (i.e. equivalence classes) with magnitudes
close to k, and therefore the better the AEC obtained (close to 1).
6.5 Assessing Utility Using Real Workflows
We assessed the degree to which anonymized provenance can be
used to answer the following 3 queries that are representative
of the queries defined by the workflow provenance challenge
community [26].10.
q1 Find the workflow executions that led to a given record in the
workflow results.
q2 Find the input data records that contributed to a given data
10We could not use the provenance challenge queries as they are since they were
specified for a single specific workflow on image processing.
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record in the workflow result.
q3 Find the difference between two workflow execution.
For this experiment, we used 14 real-world Taverna workflows.
The size of the workflows ranges from 3 modules to 24 modules,
and have different structures patterns. We ran each workflow
30 times, and captured the provenance obtained using the Tav-
erna workflow systems. We then anonymized the provenance by
varying the group anonymity degree kgmax from 1 to 10, and ex-
amined whether queries of the form listed above can be answered
using the anonymized provenance.
Regarding q1 and q2, a user is presented with anonymized
workflow provenance, and as such cannot pinpoint a single data
record in the results that can be used as input to q1 and q2.
Instead, s/he chooses a (set) of data records that belong to the
same equivalence class. As expected, the larger is the anonymity
degree, the larger is the set of data records to be considered (see
Table 12). Note that on the other hand, the query results obtained
had 100% precision and recall, regardless of the value of group-
anonymity degree used. This was possible thanks to the fact that
our anonymization method preserves lineage across data records.
Table 12: Size of the data record sets used as input to q1
and q2 given kgmax, averaged over the 14 workflows.
kgmax 1 2 4 6 8 10
avg size of the set of data records 3 6 11 20 25 33
Regarding q3, the provenance challenge does not formally
specify what it is meant by the difference of workflow executions
[26]. That said, this question has later been thoroughly examined
by Bao et al. [5]. They defined the difference between workflow
executions of the same workflow specification using the edit
distance which is the minimum number of edit operations that
transform one provenance graph structure to the other. Using this
definition, the edit distance between every pair of anonymized
provenance graphs (of the 14 workflow specifications that we
used) was the same as the edit distance computed using their
counterpart original provenance graphs. This can be explained by
the fact that our anonymization solution preserves the structure
of the provenance graph as-is (since one of the requirements
that we set is to preserve lineage information). Therefore, the
original provenance graph of a given workflow specification is
homomorphic to its anonymized counterpart.
This experiment has shown the utility of the workflow prove-
nance anonymized using our solution since we were able to
answer the three classes of queries. This evaluation exercise has
also shown that for q1 and q2, the input of the query size (number
of records) depends on the anonymity degree. Smaller anonymity
degrees allow having smaller sets of data records that can be used
for the queries, and vice-versa.
6.6 Efficiency
The only operation that is costly in the anonymization solution
presented is the grouping of sets of data records, which we imple-
mented using the integer program minimizeG (Section 5). Note,
however, that such an operation is performed only once for the
input of the initial module of the workflow. Indeed, the remain-
ing parameters of the modules that compose the workflow apply
the same grouping as the one applied to the input of the initial
module.
That said, we investigated the cost of such an operation to
group n data sets, where n = 50, 100, 100, · · · , 500. As expected,
this experiment showed that time required increased as does the
number of module invocations. Interestingly, the experiment also
showed that the time required for performing the grouping of
the sets of data records is primarily impacted by the distribution
of the magnitude of the sets of data records to be grouped. To
illustrate this, Table 13 shows the time required for grouping
100 sets of data records where the magnitude of the sets follows
different distributions. This experiment showed that using a uni-
form distribution, the range has little impact on the time required
for grouping. On the other hand, it showed that sets that follow
a geometric distribution with high success probability (50% and
higher) require a considerable time compared to sets that follow a
uniform distribution. This can be explained by the fact that for a
geometric distribution with high success probability, the majority
of the sets have the same (or close) magnitudes. Therefore, many
of the groupings that are explored by the integer program yield
similar values for the objective function. As a result, the integer
program records little progress (convergence towards the optimal
solution) and ends up exploring a large space of solutions, which
impacts negatively the efficiency.
Table 13: Time for grouping 100 sets of data records.
Distribution type Distribution parameter Time
Uniform
range = [1...20] 16.2 sec
range = [1...50] 14.3 sec
range = [1...100] 18.4 sec
Geometric
success prob = 10% 29.4 sec
success prob = 50% 5 min 11 sec
success prob = 80% 17 min 7sec
The above results prompted us to develop an alternative solu-
tion when the magnitudes of the sets follow a geometric distri-
bution with high success probability. In such situations, most of
the record sets have the same magnitude l. We randomly form
groups containing the records of ⌈ kl ⌉ sets. The magnitudes of
most of the groups obtained by unioning the sets in each group
are larger or equal to k. The groups that fail to meet the target
magnitude of k (and there are only a few of them given the dis-
tribution), are unionied pairwise until meeting the target of k
data records per group. This simple method allowed us to group
sets of data records in the orders of microseconds with a small
impact on the AEC, which was higher by a margin of 0.03 in av-
erage compared with the situation in which we used our integer
program minimizeG.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented, in this paper, a solution for systematically
anonymizing the provenance of collection-oriented workflows.
Evaluation exercises allowed us to tease apart the aspects that
impact the quality of the anonymization, namely the disparity
between the anonymity degrees of the input and output sets
of a module (or more generally the inputs and outputs of the
modules that compose the workflow), the disparity between the
anonymity degree and the magnitude of the sets of data records,
and the distribution of the magnitudes of the record sets. We
also examined the utility of the anonymized provenance using
real-world workflows, and assessed the efficiency of our solution.
In our ongoing work, we are investigating the applicability of our
solution to anonymization techniques, other than k-anonymity,
e.g., l-diversity and t-closeness [15]. We are also investigating
the incorporation of vocabularies (hierarchies of concepts) to
our solution. In the solution we presented, we substitute each
quasi-identifier attribute value with a set containing the values
that that attribute takes given a group (i.e. equivalence class) of
data records. We will investigate how the use of vocabularies
can be incorporated in our solution for generalizing the values
of quasi-identifier attributes.
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